This paper analyzes the run on Continental Illinois in 1984. We find that the run slowed but did not stop following an extraordinary government guarantee of all liabilities of the bank and commitment to provide ongoing liquidity support. Continental's outflows were driven by large, sophisticated counterparties with holdings far in excess of the insurance limit. A broad range of domestic financial institutions participated in the initial run, while foreign-based institutions withdrew more in the succeeding period. Among US-based commercial bank creditors in particular, liquidity preferences appear to have played a role in spurring the early run, while in subsequent months the size of banks' exposures to Continental became a more important factor. Finally, we show that the concentration of holdings of Continental's liabilities was a key dynamic in the run and was importantly linked to Continental's systemic importance.
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Introduction
Continental Illinois (Continental) was a major US commercial bank that experienced a massive and widely publicized run by its short-term creditors in 1 Out of fear that
Continental's failure would have broad fallout in the financial system, federal regulators provided the bank with several forms of support, including funding from the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, and an exceptional guarantee of all of the bank's creditors by the FDIC (FDIC 1997 (FDIC , 1998 . These actions calmed the situation temporarily, but troubles at the bank persisted and two months after the run started, the FDIC essentially took over the bank to rehabilitate it.
Eventually, Continental was recapitalized and reprivatized; previous shareholders were wiped out and the FDIC absorbed serious losses. This episode is well known for elevating the neologism "Too Big to Fail" in public consciousness and prompting a national discussion about very large banks.
2
In this paper, we study the run on Continental and the impact of the government response, particularly the FDIC's guarantee of all bank liabilities. To do so, we use a remarkable data set, comprising daily data on broad aggregates of Continental's liabilities and monthly data on the holdings of Continental's liabilities by a large number of individual institutions. The daily data quickly reveal that the run on Continental was immense and extremely swift. In just 9 days, 30 percent of the firm's previous funding had left and was replaced by new funds from the government and a support coalition of private banks. In addition, the government's announcement of support had only a modest impact in stemming the run among Continental's creditors. The pace of the run diminished, but private creditors continued to withdraw their funds from Continental until a permanent support program was put in place. After that private investors slowly returned. 1 We generally use the phrase "Continental" to refer to the entire bank holding company, Continental Illinois Corporation (CIC). The main subsidiary of CIC was Continental Illinois National Bank, which held the great bulk of CIC's assets. Where specificity is needed we refer specifically to the holding company or the bank subsidiary. 2 The connection between the bailout of Continental and the origins of the phrase "too big to fail" in the bank regulatory lexicon may have arisen during Comptroller of the Currency Conover's testimony on September 19, 1984 to the House subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance. In the session, Congressman St Germain asked Conover whether he could foresee letting one of the eleven international money center banks fail and Conover admitted that, in the absence of a way of handling a large bank subsequent to its failure, he could not. Congressman McKinney promptly labeled these large banks as "too big to fail" (Conover 1984, p. 300) . The press had been using the phrase "too big to fail" since at least July 1984, but this is often considered the first time a government official indicated that large banks might not be allowed to fail.
-2 -With the monthly data we are able to characterize the types of creditors that were more likely to run. Importantly, Continental's creditors were large and sophisticated. As a result, to understand the decision to run, we focus on the financial condition and structure of the counterparties. In contrast, previous studies of runs have largely examined household depositors, often at small savings banks, and therefore have naturally focused on deposit insurance and social networks (Brown, Guin, and Morkuetter (2013) , Kelly and Ó'Gráda (2000) , Ó'Gráda and
White (2003) and Iyer and Puri (2012) ). We find that the initial run was driven by a broad set of US-based financial institutions, including depositories and money market institutions. Foreign institutions and municipal creditors withdrew a smaller portion of their funds during the initial run but picked up their withdrawals in the following months.
Many of Continental's creditors were US depository institutions. We gather additional information about the financial condition of those institutions and estimate a simple model to predict which were likely to withdraw large amounts. In particular, we examine whether their withdrawal patterns were consistent with financial conditions that indicate desires for liquidity, fear of losses, or fear of contagion. Early on, in the run that occurred during May, liquidity preferences appear to have played a role, as those creditors that held the most liquidity on their books were more likely to withdraw large amounts. In addition, we find some evidence of fear of contagion, as creditors that raised funds through bulk deposits in a similar manner to
Continental were less likely to withdraw large amounts. After May, the data exhibit a different pattern, in which banks that were most exposed to Continental were more likely to mitigate those exposures by withdrawing, suggesting a fear of losses. In addition, in both periods smaller banks and more physically distant banks tended to withdraw more funds from Continental, perhaps revealing information about the quality of geographically proximate creditors' relationships with Continental, and the sophistication of the management of large banks.
The last part of this paper describes how the concentration of funding in a small number of large accounts had important implications in this episode. While many large financial institutions provided funds to Continental, the distribution of the size of liability holdings was heavily skewed: A few institutions were responsible for a significant amount of Continental's funding. Consequently, while a broad set of creditors withdrew funds from Continental, the outflows were quite concentrated among the largest creditors. For example, Continental's largest -3 -25 creditors as of April 1984 withdrew about $2 billion from April to August, roughly 6 percent of the bank's total liabilities and about 30 percent of the total withdrawals. Each of these large creditors was owed tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, far above the insurance limit. Such large short-term creditors have long played key roles in deposit runs, and remain important features of the banking system today. They deserve special focus in planning for potential future crises.
Some of the largest providers of funding for Continental were money market mutual funds. It is highly likely that these institutions would have suffered losses and "broken the buck" in the event that Continental had been allowed to fail. As money market funds were important providers of funds to many other large financial institutions, even at this time, problems at money market funds would likely have had systemic consequences. 3 The funding data also indicate that several large banking institutions had significant exposures to Continental and that these institutions may have faced significant losses. Thus, even if the government support did not stop the funding drain on Continental, it does appear to have been important in preventing serious spillovers to other institutions and thus in containing the crisis.
These findings have important lessons for policymakers. One lesson is that a guarantee of liabilities by the FDIC may not be effective in stabilizing the funding of troubled institutions.
In the future, one method for dealing with an insolvent but systemically important depository institution could be for the FDIC to place it into a special type of receivership, using its new Orderly Liquidation Authority. This type of receivership is intended to provide for the resolution of a firm in the long run, but the preservation of the firm's systemically important operations in the short run. Under such circumstances, an important question is whether the FDIC would be able to convince short-term creditors to stay. Continental's experience suggests that obtaining sufficient financing from private sources to keep the firm operating while in receivership may be difficult.
In addition to adding to the literature on banking runs, this paper also adds to our understanding of the impact of general guarantees for a financial institution's creditors. Scholars 3 While it is not clear that any difficulties would have approached the troubles that occurred in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the "breaking of the buck" by Reserve Fund, it is likely that there would have been significant dislocations.
-4 -have noted that, during financial crises, a government guarantee of the liabilities of private financial institutions, like the one put in place for Continental, is one of the strongest responses that can be employed (Estrella 2001, Tanaka and Hoggarth 2006) . For example, the U.S.
Treasury issued a guarantee of money market mutual fund investments to stop a run on those funds during the financial crisis of 2008 (Bernanke 2009 , McCabe 2010 (Ingves and Lind, 1996) . We find that the FDIC and Federal Reserve support appeared effective in calming some of the investors who may have been somewhat more susceptible to some spillovers from the Continental episode, but investors who had substantial exposures directly to Continental still tended to reduce those exposures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the crisis at Continental. Section 3 discusses the dynamics of various deposit aggregates during the crisis and section 4 examines the composition of creditors and which creditors were more likely to run.
In section 5 we discuss the responses to the FDIC guarantee along with how the responses compared to other instances of government support. Section 6 discusses the distribution of liabilities, and the role that concentration played in the run and in shaping Continental's systemic importance. Section 7 concludes. Continental increasingly raised funds in the Eurodollar market rather than in the domestic commercial paper market, and its funding costs increased.
Section 2. Overview of the 1984 Crisis at Continental Illinois
5 Table 1 shows the degree to which the bank had funded its expansion by aggressively competing for wholesale deposits, rather than by the means of a retail banking business. The Continental also provided a variety of services to institutions involved with Chicago financial markets, and some of those institutions maintained balances with Continental in connection with those services. Additionally, Continental funded itself with a moderate amount of funds purchased on the federal funds and repo markets.
Continental's insurance coverage for its deposits was quite low, with only around 15 percent of deposits insured by the FDIC. The low coverage was due to Continental's reliance on foreign deposits, which are not eligible for FDIC insurance, and the fact that only about 40 percent of its domestic deposits were covered by the insurance. 6 Moreover, Continental had a substantial number of other domestic liabilities that were not covered by insurance. CDs reportedly tried to dump them in the secondary market (Bailey and Zaslow 1984) . To address its funding problems, Continental turned increasingly to the discount window (FDIC 1997 , Kilborn 1984 , Rowe 1984 .
In response, the banking industry rallied to support Continental. On Monday, May 14,
Continental announced that 16 of the nation's largest commercial banks had agreed to provide the firm with $4.5 billion in short-term credit (Bailey, Carrington, and Hertzberg 1984) . 9 This action was reportedly taken in part to shore up the confidence of financial market participants, especially overseas investors, and prevent the crisis from spreading. There were some indications that the provision of this facility eased general conditions; interest rates retreated somewhat and the Wall Street Journal reported that markets for managed deposits were calmer (Bailey, Helyar, and Hertzberg 1984) . However, other reports indicated that the run on Continental continued as foreign depositors refused to renew CDs and Continental's sources for eurodollar funding were being withdrawn (FDIC 1997; Sprague 1986, p.154 In view of all the circumstances surrounding Continental Illinois Bank, the F.D.I.C. provides assurance that, in any arrangements that may be necessary to achieve a permanent solution, all depositors and other general creditors of the bank will be fully protected and service to the bank's customers will not be interrupted.
This guarantee was particularly important given Continental's low level of insurance coverage;
the FDIC (1998) reported that at this point, Continental had about $3 billion of insured liabilities and $30 billion of uninsured liabilities. The guarantee covered all the creditors, including the uninsured liabilities. Liabilities of the bank holding company excluding the bank were not covered, although these were generally small (Moody's reports that at the end of 1983, liabilities of the consolidated company were $40.3 billion of which nonbank subsidiaries accounted for $1.2 billion).
In the same press release, the FDIC also announced an injection of $2 billion into the bank in the form of subordinated notes provided by itself and a group of commercial banks The
Federal Reserve stated that it would meet extraordinary liquidity needs, without many further details. Finally, the $4.5 billion short-term credit facility from 16 commercial banks, which had been initiated on May 14, was replaced by a $5.3 billion line of credit to Continental from a consortium of 24 banks. 11 The bank support coalition eventually expanded to 28.
The regulators stated that the assistance package and guarantee were needed to maintain confidence and prevent the run on Continental from spreading to other large banks (Conover 1984, and Volker 1984) . Of particular concern was that the run on Continental would cause funding problems at other large institutions. The chair of the FDIC argued that "the funding problem at Continental was beginning to affect financial markets generally. Something needed to 10 Before Continental, we know of one instance in which the FDIC gave an explicit general guarantee of all creditors to a depository institution: Greenwich Savings Bank in 1982 (see p. 223 of the FDIC (1997), chapter 6). Nevertheless, Continental's guarantee was of much greater significance given Continental's size and systemic importance. In other instances prior to Continental and Greenwich the FDIC had provided open bank assistance to troubled institutions. This assistance involves capital injections, therefore providing protection to the general creditors of the institutions being assisted, but not explicit guarantees. 11 Soon thereafter, four additional banks joined the group to provide loans.
-8 -be done quickly to stabilize the situation" (Isaac 1984, p. 459 institutions (Sprague 1986, p. 155) . These concerns were reportedly reflected in market data; Bailey and Zaslow (1984) reported a widening of spreads between rates on Treasury Bills and bank CDs for banks other than Continental. 12 Further, Continental had numerous correspondent banks and the FDIC maintained that the deposits of these smaller banks needed to be guaranteed to keep these institutions from failing (Conover 1984 , FDIC 1997 . Isaac (1984, pp. 470-474) noted that even if some of the smaller banks might not have failed had Continental closed, they might have experienced liquidity problems and decreased profitability while Continental was being liquidated.
The initial response by regulators and other commercial banks was meant to assure investors that there would be sufficient capital, liquidity, and time to arrange an orderly resolution. It did appear to calm markets for a time. However, starting in late June, concern gradually re-emerged about the viability of Continental and the bank experienced renewed outflows of deposits. On July 26, federal regulators announced a permanent assistance plan (FDIC 1998) . Under this plan, the FDIC acquired $1 billion in preferred stock in Continental's holding company (an 80 percent stake), with the ability to convert these shares into common stock at a later date. The FDIC also assumed Continental's liabilities to the discount window, which had been hovering between $2 billion and $4 billion, and in return received an equal amount of loans held by Continental in its asset portfolio, along with an option to buy stock in Continental at a rate that depended on the recovery rate on the loans. The Federal Reserve also agreed to continue to provide liquidity assistance (and the commercial banks continued to extend a line of credit). The permanent assistance plan was put into place in September, and was successful in preventing Continental from being closed. Discount window borrowings by the bank edged up briefly following the July announcement, but then declined steadily as the firm was able to use market sources to a greater extent. Financial markets remained orderly.
However, the assistance plan was one of the most expensive ever arranged by financial regulators at the time: the FDIC estimated its cost for the bailout at $1.1 billion and Continental's shareholders were essentially wiped out. Thus, the interim support announcement appears to have been successful in stopping the run in some of the most volatile funding sources, such as federal funds and repos, which tend to be overnight. Other sources of funding do not appear to have been as strongly influenced.
Section 4. Composition of creditors and runners
To analyze the composition of creditors, and which were most likely to run, we also have data on the individual liability holdings of nearly 600 institutions at a month-average frequency Comparing these data to aggregates for the holding company filed in the Y9-C report form, we estimate the CTS documents capture the bulk of federal funds borrowings and about 65 percent of offshore deposits. In other areas, the CTS documents capture less, such as the domestic deposit market where our data cover only about 20 percent of the roughly $7 billion in domestic deposits. We view our data as most representative of large depositors that are least likely to be insured and most likely to run, and which are the types of depositors of most interest to us in this -11 -creditor in the panel contributed to funding to Continental in every month. Rather, in any given month, Continental typically had nonzero liabilities to about 350 to 450 of those in the panel.
For each month in 1984, the documents give the average amount of funding provided by each of the creditors, which include domestic banks, foreign banks, money funds, brokers and investment banks, the U.S. government and its agencies, foreign governments, international institutions, corporations, and state and municipal governments, and others. The data cover all types of funding provided to Continental from these creditors, including domestic and foreign deposits, federal funds, commercial paper, discount window loans, and other forms.
Section 4.1 Types of creditors
We report the distribution of funding provided by the creditors in the CTS panel by type of institution in Table 3 . Just prior to the run, in April 1984, the most numerous group was domestic banks which, when including both those in and outside the support coalition, accounted for a bit less than 25 percent of the liabilities. Foreign banks were the largest by amount, holding a bit more than 30 percent of the liabilities, and also had the highest average balance. Money market institutions (money funds, brokers, and investment banks) and foreign governments were also important funding sources for Continental and provided 18 percent of the funding covered in the CTS reports. A fairly sizeable number of corporations maintained balances at Continental, though these balances were generally of more modest size. Rounding out the sample are savings and loan associations and other customers, which primarily consists of municipalities. typical practice for such deposits. In the months shortly after the FDIC guarantee, from May to August, the percent declines in exposure for most groups was about the same as it had been for the single month covering the run period (which implies a notable decline in the monthly rate at which exposures were reduced). The most noticeable exception is the foreign bank category, the institutions which had reduced their exposures the least during the initial run, which then withdrew at a much faster pace.
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Section 4.2 Outflows in a cross section of banks
In this section, we further investigate the funding outflows by assessing whether creditors with certain characteristics were more likely to make large withdrawals. We focus on domestic banks, as we are able to obtain detailed financial information on those institutions from regulatory filings. One caveat to this analysis is that, given the concentrated nature of
Continental's funding that we will discuss in section 5, the cross sectional results may or may not translate into major aggregate funding movements, depending on whether or not the institutions supplying the largest amounts of funding to Continental conform to the average trends we identify.
As a first step, we match as many domestic banks from the CTS reports as possible to data from the Reports of Income and Condition (Call Reports) on those institutions. While we are not able to verify the identity of every bank listed in the CTS reports because of the ambiguities of some of their names, we are able to successfully match 128 of the 136 domestic banks not in the support coalition and that provided nonzero funding to Continental in April or 20 Similar patterns are also apparent when we examine withdrawal behavior at individual institutions. For example, we ran a simple probit regression (not shown) of a dummy variable-indicating a withdrawal of more than 50 percent from April to May-on dummies for each institution type. The results suggest that foreign banks, foreign and other customers were about 20-30 percentage points less likely to withdraw than the omitted group, domestic banks, and that money market institutions, savings and loans, and corporations had average withdrawal rates not statistically significantly different than domestic banks.
-13 -May 1984. 21 When analyzing the run from April to May, we exclude 19 banks that provided $300,000 or less in funding to Continental in April (to ensure that we are capturing the behavior of institutions whose incentives might have been affected by the deposit insurance limit, which was $100,000 at the time). Overall we have a sample of 109 banks for the initial run period.
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Given the modest number of institutions in the sample, we also use a limited number of variables, measured as of March 31, 1984 , to predict the extent to which each institution participated in the run on Continental. Summary statistics of these variables are shown in Table   4 . To measure preferences for liquidity, we use the ratio of cash and Treasury securities to assets. To measure potential fear of losses, we include the size of each bank's exposure to
Continental with the total funding provided as of April 1984 divided by assets, and we take the log of this variable since a handful of banks have very large exposures. We also include capital adequacy, gauged by the ratio of equity to assets. To measure potential fear of contagion to these banks' own funding structures, we include the ratio of domestic large time deposits to liabilities, the ratio of borrowing via fed fund and repos to liabilities, and an indicator of whether the bank raises at least five percent of its funds from foreign deposits.
23
We include several other variables to measure additional aspects of these banks' business models that may affect their withdrawal behavior. We use log assets to measure the size of the institutions. We use distance from Chicago to measure physical proximity to Continental, which could be correlated with other unobservable relationships between the banks and Continental. In particular, banks in Illinois and the surrounding states may hold deposits with Continental for different reasons or have different views on the institution and its prospects compared to those located farther away. To account for performance, we include the net income to equity, as well as the overall delinquency rate. We include loans to assets as a measure of business model, excluding loans to depository institutions. Separately, we include amounts due from other banks to assets.
-14 -In interpreting any correlation between withdrawal behavior and these variables, we must keep in mind that each of these variables relates to other aspects of the banks' business models.
For example, a bank with a large amount of assets would not withdraw or deposit money with
Continental because of the large amount of assets, but rather because large banks may systemically have different business models than smaller banks, with more sophisticated risk management, or more diversification, for example. Nevertheless, we can generally rule out the possibility of reverse causation-that withdrawing from Continental caused banks to display certain balance sheet characteristics. Given the sudden onset of the run, and the fact that we measure these balance sheet variables as of the end of March while the run occurs in May, that direction of causation is very unlikely.
As outcome variables, we look at funding withdrawals during the initial run period (April to May) separate from during the subsequent months (May to August). 24 We take the reaction in the first period as capturing primarily the response during the initial run period before the government response. However, since our data are monthly-average data, some portion of the change from April to May will reflect movements during the first few days of May, before the initial run. The period from May to August more clearly captures behavior after the government guarantees were put in place.
The outcomes we examine are measures of withdrawals. Our first outcome variable is the percent decrease in funding. This variable is naturally bounded above because creditors cannot withdraw more than 100 percent of their funding, but has no bound below. 25 Indeed, the summary statistics in Table 4 show that this variable takes on extreme outlying values in some cases, such as a negative 6270 percent decrease in funding (i.e. a 6270 percent increase) from
May to August at the most extreme, in cases where creditors increase their funding from small initial levels. In order to avoid assigning undue importance to these outliers in our analysis, we -15 -use a median regression when analyzing this variable. Our second outcome variable is a simple dummy variable that indicates whether an institution withdrew more than 50 percent of its funds, similar to that used by Iyer and Puri (2012) . 26 While this variable loses some information about the degree of funding changes, it has the advantage of avoiding outliers and focusing on large withdrawals.
We also explore additional outcome variables and models as robustness checks. In a Tobit model, we use the percent of funding withdrawn, but bounded below at negative 100 percent. While this lower bound is artificial, the approach has the advantage of explicitly acknowledging the unavoidable upper bound of 100 percent withdrawals. As another approach, we sort the sample into quintiles by the percent decrease in funding, ranking the quintiles from 1 to 5, and estimate an ordered logit.
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April to May
The results for the initial period, from April to May, are shown in Table 5a , and robustness checks in Table 5b . Here and in the subsequent tables, we report robust standard errors in parentheses and, where relevant, marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables. A positive coefficient indicates that a larger value of the independent variable is associated with a greater degree of withdrawal in the funding provided to Continental (in column 1) or a higher propensity to withdraw 50 percent or more (in column 2). Table 5a displays the median regression and probit analysis. Tables 5b displays, as robustness checks, the Tobit and ordered logit specifications, as well as variants of the probit analysis with thresholds of 75 percent and 90 percent instead of 50 percent.
28 26 Iyer and Puri (2012) use a threshold of 75 percent and report 90 percent as a robustness check. Since we have monthly average data rather than daily data, we consider a smaller threshold to be more appropriate, but report results using these larger thresholds as robustness checks and for purposes of comparison. As a stylized example of the withdrawal rates we could expect from the data, suppose a creditor supplied Continental with $10 million each day in April and through May 8. If the creditor withdrew 100 percent of their funds on May 9 th , the data would show a 74 percent withdrawal. Thus, larger rates of withdrawal of 75 percent or more could be recorded if the creditor edged down deposits at all in the beginning of May, which is possible given regular volatility in deposits, but rates of withdrawal in the range of 90 percent would reflect significant withdrawals before the run. 27 Using deciles instead of quintiles yielded identical results. 28 In the ordered logit quintile estimation we display the marginal effects on the probability of the bank's withdrawal rate falling in the highest quintile of withdrawal rates, which corresponds to a withdrawal rate of 73 percent or greater.
-16 -Overall, the results suggest that larger banks and physically closer banks were less likely to withdraw, and that preferences for liquidity and possible fear of contagion from Continental's fallout also motivated smaller withdrawals, but fear of direct losses on investments in Continental do not appear to have driven withdrawal patterns.
In terms of large banks being less likely to withdraw, the magnitude is fairly large: a one log point difference in size (roughly the difference between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles)
corresponds to a 25 percentage point decrease in the probability of a large withdrawal in the baseline probit specification. Combined with the fact that the 28-bank support coalition (not included in these regressions) comprised many of the country's largest banks, these results
indicate that large banks inside and outside the coalition were more stable funding partners for
Continental. In part, the large banks could have been acting in self-interest, out of a desire to avoid possible contagion to themselves if Continental's failure had disrupted funding markets.
Even so, the banks outside of the support coalition never publicly committed themselves to support Continental. If they had an incentive to withdraw, they would have also have had an incentive to free ride on the support of others. The fact that they tended to not do so could reflect, as another explanation, more sophisticated managers who were in a better position to understand the FDIC's guarantee and satisfy themselves with the guarantee even though the FDIC left many details unexplained. That said, as a group in aggregate domestic banks withdrew a good deal of money from Continental, implying that the large number of withdrawals from smaller banks added up.
Regarding preferences for liquidity, the magnitude is medium in size: a one standard deviation increase in the liquidity variable is associated with about 12 percentage point higher likelihood of a large withdrawal in the baseline probit specification. From one perspective, the fact that these banks held such large liquidity buffers, they could be less concerned than others about losing the liquidity of their funds in Continental. However, the elevated liquidity at these banks could be a sign that their managers had a preference for liquidity, perhaps due to the business model of those banks that might involve larger than average potential turnover of funds.
In terms of geography, the probit results suggest that banks that were located physically close to Continental were less likely to withdraw large amounts. Though the median regression does not yield this result, the various robustness checks in Table 5b does. This result is robust to -17 -excluding a small number of banks that were located in Chicago and in Illinois, as other nearby banks were located in Wisconsin and Indiana. One possible explanation is that nearby banks had different and more longstanding relationships with Continental, or perhaps were more likely to suffer if Continental had failed.
There may be evidence for fear of contagion, as banks that raised relatively higher amounts of their funds from large time deposits were less likely to withdraw. Such an avenue of contagion was noted by the financial press at the time (and is discussed more in the next section), and may have led these banks to support Continental lest their own ability to raise funds be constrained, though it seems that this would be subject to a free riding problem.
Interestingly, we do not find strong evidence that banks with larger exposures to Continental (measured relative to their assets) were more likely to make large withdrawals, at least in the initial period from April to May. As we will see below, there is a bit more evidence that the most exposed institutions did withdraw more during the second period from May to August. One interpretation of these results is that the managers of these institutions understood the support provided by the FDIC and the Fed in the short run and so did not rush to withdraw, but over the subsequent months nevertheless had an incentive to pull down their funding to more modest proportions.
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May to August
Results for the second period, from May to August, are shown in Table 6a , and robustness checks in 6b. The sample is limited to banks which had provided funding to Continental in May of at least $300,000, yielding 12 fewer banks than in April, given the withdrawals from April to May. The independent variables are the same with two exceptions.
First, we add a dummy for whether a bank withdrew more than 50 percent of its funds in the first period. Second, we include the quadratic of log assets, as tests for nonlinearity (not shown) favor its inclusion here, but did not in the regressions for the earlier period. Tables 5a, 5b , and 5c, we put less stress on the statistical result that banks with high amounts of loans to depository institutions were more likely to withdraw, because this is sensitive to a couple of outlying observations. Similarly, the statistical result on loan delinquency rates is sensitive to one outlier. 30 In Table 6b , the quintile estimation again displays the marginal effects associated with the highest quintile of withdrawal rates, which here corresponds to a withdrawal rate of 100 percent.
-18 -As in the previous period, the results suggest that larger banks and closer banks were less likely to withdraw large amounts. In contrast to the previous period, there is some mixed evidence pointing to a stronger role for the relative exposure of different banks to Continental.
According to the probit specification, banks which supplied relatively large amounts of their assets to Continental were more likely to make large withdrawals. It appears that while such highly-exposed banks were not in a rush to run on Continental in May, they nevertheless preferred to substantially reduce their exposures to the troubled bank over the next few months during the summer. In addition, the sign on the coefficient of the liquidity measure turns negative in the second period, suggesting that liquidity concerns related to investing in Continental mitigated after May.
After August
Following the approval of the permanent restructuring plan in late July, the creditor data show that Continental was able to attract some funding from private sector creditors and reduce its dependence on government support. Nevertheless, the overall size of its non-government liability base remained well below the level at the start of the year. In the same spirit as the previous analysis, it is interesting to analyze what institutions were likely to increase or decrease the funding they provided to Continental.
First, we look at all of Continental's creditors (not just domestic banks) between August 1984 and January 1985, outlined in Table 7 . Of the 447 institutions outside of the support coalition, 147 (about one-third) increased the funding they provided to Continental over this period. Nevertheless, those who withdrew funding represented half of all creditors, and twothirds of those that still provided any funding at all as of August. Some of the institutions that increased their funding to Continental had previously had not provide much to the bank, and in some cases the amount of new funding was quite considerable. The institutions that increased their exposure to Continental appear to have had confidence in the rescue plan (and were likely attracted by the premiums that Continental was willing to pay).
Looking at the types of institutions that increased or decreased funding according to Table 7 , it is apparent that foreign governments and international agencies, as well as money funds, brokers, and investment banks, were notably less likely to increase funding than other -19 -types of institutions (for both types, there were about three institutions that decreased funding to
Continental for each institution that increased funding). Nonfinancial corporations appear to
have been the most willing to increase funding (the same number increased funds provided to Continental as decreased funding). As speculation, we note that one difference between these types of institutions is the scrutiny they would face about where they placed their funds.
Governments are subject to public scrutiny and unlikely to want to deal with negative publicity should they be found to be keeping funds with a troubled foreign bank. Similarly, investors in money funds are generally quite risk averse and such institutions might prefer to avoid being associated with Continental. By contrast, nonfinancial corporations are generally subject to relatively less scrutiny than the other types of institutions about where they invest their shortterm cash.
Focusing again on our sample of domestic banks, we run a similar regression as before but use the change in funding provided to Continental from August 1984 to January 1985 as our dependent variable. We again run a median regression with the percent increase in funding after
August as the outcome variable, and a probit regression with a dummy variable indicating whether the change in funding after August was positive. In Table 8a , the sample is restricted to institution with at least $300,000 in deposits in August 1984. In Table 8b , we expand the sample for the probit analysis to the full sample of banks that provided funding to Continental as of April, and also conduct a Tobit analysis as a robustness check.
The results suggest some reversal of the factors that were important in predicting institution's run behavior during the spring and summer. Larger institutions in this period were less likely to increase their funding to Continental, and in general those institutions that had withdrawn 50 percent or more from April to August were much more likely to increase their funding after August. Scholars have also studied the effect of static guarantee policies on runs. In their examination of a run at a small cooperative bank in India, Iyer and Puri (2012) find that the deposit insurance system did help the bank retain insured depositors, but there were still withdrawals by some fully-insured depositors with balances closer to the insurance limit.
Brown, Guin, and Morkoetter find that coverage by deposit insurance had little effect on the -21 - From Continental's point of view, perhaps the FDIC hasn't done enough to reassure depositors. One banking official close to Continental's problems said, "All there is (to explain the FDIC's guarantee) is a press release. The FDIC won't provide more specificity. That quite obviously limits the effectiveness of the assurance. There is no precedent for this," the banker said, "so it's probably very difficult for investors to get their arms around (the FDIC guarantee)."
It is possible that the press release, which was quite laconic (see it quoted above on page 5), did not give enough details, such as listing all types of creditors that would be covered, or how and when the funds would be released. Along these lines, Guttentag and Herring (1987) assert that concerns about the lack of formal legal safeguards led to reluctance among Continentals'
creditors. Concerns about the ambiguity of the press release may have been most important for foreign banks whose officers would be least familiar with FDIC policies. However, the CTS reports show the large declines in funding provided by domestic depository institutions between June and August, which is somewhat surprising as these institutions were most likely to increase their exposure (about 21 percent of these institutions in the sample did so), and some increased the amount of funding they were providing considerably. As discussed above, there
were also further increases in funding in late 1984. Thus it appears that at least some institutions took the government guarantee fairly seriously.
Section 6 Liability concentration and Continental's systemic risk
The CTS reports reveal that, before the run, Continental's liabilities were heavily concentrated with a small number of large creditors. Looking at all non-U.S. government institutions, in April 1984, Continental's largest 10 creditors provided funding of $3.4 billion, (roughly 9 percent of all liabilities). The largest 25 funded about $6 billion (16 percent of all liabilities). 33 Among those creditors holding domestic deposits, the deposit insurance limit of $100 thousand would have been essentially irrelevant given that all of the largest 25 creditors held liabilities exceeding $100 million each. About half of the largest 25 creditors were foreign banks, and the rest were a mix of domestic banks, money market funds, and foreign governments or international institutions.
The concentration of funding played an important role during the run. To document this, in Table 9 we examine the concentration of funding among institutions that were not part of the support coalition. The creditors are separated into groups such that their exposures are roughly equal in size. The top 10 accounted for nearly 22 percent of the funding from these institutions, while the next 15 accounted for another 17 percent. The run-off rates from April to May are 33 Total liabilities are measured as of the March 31, 1984 call report for the purposes of these comparisons.
-23 -shown to the right. The run-off rate for the top 10 is elevated compared to the other groups. In addition, because of the size of the top group's initial liability holdings, the sizable run-off rate in this group meant that the dollar drop in funding from just 10 institutions accounted for about one-third of the total decline that we observe. Thus, this small number of institutions had a very large impact on the funding situation. In contrast, the run-off rate for the next banks 15 largest bank creditors is modest in size, giving Continental some amount of much-needed stability but also underscoring the idiosyncratic levels of support that Continental faced from its most important creditors. Each of the remaining groups of creditors also decreased their funding to Continental, by varying amounts. This concentration is also related to the nature of Continental's systemic importance, and in fact we identify an additional channel through which Continental may have posed a systemic risk. Several of the largest creditors were money market mutual funds. Four of these funds had exposures to Continental amounting to more than $100 million. For at least one institution, which has publicly available information on total assets, the holdings of Continental funds accounted for roughly 7 percent of its assets. Given the losses incurred by the FDIC, it is highly likely that this fund would have seen a significant loss in the event that Continental had been allowed to fail. Even apart from those losses, these mutual funds would have seen these assets become inconvertible to cash and the funds' liquidity would have dried up.
The exposures of money funds to Continental brings to mind one aspect of the [2007] [2008] [2009] financial crisis, when there were considerable disruptions after a money market fund "broke the buck" (i.e. was no longer able to pay out $1 per share). As a result, there were rapid withdrawals which had large amounts of non-performing loans stemming from their lending to developing countries (FDIC 1997 , FDIC 1998 . Had Continental failed and significantly affected some money funds, the money funds could certainly have seriously reduced their purchases of bankissued money market instruments, either because they sought safer assets or because they experienced outflows from investors who perceived money funds as more risky than before.
Otherwise, whether the failure of Continental would have constituted a systemic event has been a matter of notable debate. The main regulators asserted that it was (Isaac 1984 , Conover 1984 , and Sprague 1986 . Some of the academic work has been more skeptical. Several papers have analyzed the effect of Continental's failure on equity prices of various banks and firms, using event study methodologies. Wall and Peterson (1990) and Swary (1986) both examine the reactions of the equity price of other large US banks, and Jayanti and Whyte (1996) similarly analyze the reactions of foreign bank equity prices. In general, they do not find much evidence that there were increased correlations of equity prices around this time which casts some doubt on the likelihood of contagion risks. Furlong (1984) and Bailey and Zaslow (1984) report that funding costs for other banks, as indicated by the spread between the rate on large negotiable CDs and the rate on comparable maturity Treasury bills, increased during Continental's travails. These findings imply that serious problems at Continental were having spillovers effects on other institutions. Looking at systemic importance from another perspective, Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck (1993) find that firms who borrowed from Continental had notable negative equity price reactions to the troubles at Continental and positive equity price reactions to the FDIC rescue efforts.
FDIC Chairman Isaac indicated that, at the time they intervened, about 66 domestic banks had exposures to Continental that exceeded their capital. (Among the institutions we can identify, we find that 14 institutions had exposures to Continental that represented at least 25 percent of the equity capital and 9 institutions had exposures that represented more than 100 percent of their equity capital.) These figures suggest that some institutions could have had -25 -significant difficulties in the event that Continental failed. However, Wall (1993) argues that few of these institutions would have actually failed.
Section 7. Conclusion and Implications for Resolution in the Future
Continental's experience has important implications for the receivership of systemically important institutions in the future. The FDIC no longer has the ability to issue the same sort of guarantee that it issued Continental, but an effectively similar guarantee could be issued if the FDIC placed a systemically important institution into receivership using the Orderly Liquidation Authority created by the Dodd-Frank Act. In doing so, the FDIC would be required to maintain the operations of the systemically important parts of the firm, and it seems quite likely that the FDIC would be required to issue a guarantee to short-term creditors, lest those creditors run on the firm and force the very unwinding that the FDIC would be seeking to prevent. Continental's experience suggests that the FDIC should nevertheless be prepared for short-term creditors to make enormous demands for withdrawals. This in turn would require large drawdowns from the Finally, we find that the FDIC guarantee did dramatically slow the precipitous run experienced by Continental and appears to have reassured some institutions that would have had the greatest reason to run. Nevertheless, institutions did continue to reduce their exposure to Continental even after the guarantee was in place. While we do not find that the FDIC guarantee -26 -enabled Continental to retain funding and reduce its reliance on government funding, that guarantee may nevertheless have been vital in preserving the stability of the financial sector.
Our data regarding the concentration of funding suggest that a few institutions had large exposures to Continental and would have suffered significantly in the event that Continental had been allowed to fail. Some of these institutions were large enough that their closure would also likely have had systemic implications. The FDIC guarantee was likely exceptionally important in preventing catastrophic losses at these institutions, allowing them to withdraw their funding, and preventing additional spillovers and thus preserving stability.
-30 - Notes: Amounts are in millions of dollars. Source: Call reports.
-31 - -32 - Note: This table reports marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5, percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. The marginal effects for the ordered logit relate to the probability of the highest quintile, i.e. with the highest withdrawal rates.
-36 - Note: This table reports marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5, percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. The marginal effects for the ordered logit relate to the probability of the highest quintile, i.e. with the highest withdrawal rates.
-38 - Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5, percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. The sample in the first three columns is banks that provided at least $400,000 in funding as of August 1984, while the sample in the fourth column provided that amount in April 1984.
-40 - -41 - Notes: Offshore deposits include the net amount due to Continental's foreign branches, and international time deposits. Domestic deposits include demand, retail savings, commercial CDs and time deposits, public funds, and retail money market funds. Not all liabilities are included so components do not sum to the total non-support liabilities from the previous figure.
-43 - 
